The heavy tank KV ("Klim Voroshilov") by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War was undoubtedly the most advanced in design and the most powerful tank in the world. It was created specifically to break through fortified defense lines, had a very strong weapon for its time, and none of the Wehrmacht anti-tank guns could penetrate its armor. German tanks in a duel with KV did not have any chances to emerge victorious at all, which forced the Reich designers to urgently start designing the Tiger and Panther.
In the Red Army, tanks of the KV family (KV-1, KV-1S, KV-2, KV-8 and KV-85) fought on all fronts from the first days of the war until 1944, when they were replaced by the famous IS-2. The latter, by the way, were a deep modernization of the same KV. However, all heavy tanks that appeared in different countries during the Second World War, one way or another, were created with an eye on the "Klim Voroshilov" - one of the most successful projects in the history of domestic tank building.
Back in the summer of 1940, in parallel with the deployment of the serial production of KV at the Kirov plant, the production of heavy tanks is being established at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (ChTZ) and plant No. 78. By July 1, Leningrad should have transferred to ChTZ “one sample of the KV tank, 20 copies technical documentation for a KV with 76-mm and 152-mm guns, and by August 1, all technological documentation ... Send a designer to ChTZ, help the plant with blanks ... Organize the production of KV armored hulls at plant No. 78, provide the plant with technical documentation - send 10 copies of drawings ".
However, one copy of the tank and documentation arrived in Chelyabinsk only in late September - early October. As a result, until the end of 1940, the production of heavy tanks at ChTZ was never organized. Only in January 1941 was it possible to arrange the assembly of the KV-1 in Chelyabinsk (the production of the KV-2 was never mastered here), and the construction of a special tank shop began. In total, by July 1, 1941, ChTZ managed to produce only 25 tanks - the tank workshop was not yet ready, and the increase in the production of heavy tanks in Chelyabinsk was planned from January 1942.
But the outbreak of war and heavy losses of the Red Army in tanks required the adoption of urgent measures to increase their production at all factories, including in Chelyabinsk. To accomplish this task at ChTZ, first of all, it was necessary to solve the problem with the manufacture of armored hulls and towers, since plant No. 78 could not cope with this (ChTZ did not have its own armored production). Therefore, by the decision of the State Defense Committee (GKO), the Ural Heavy Machine Building Plant named after Sergo Ordzhonikidze (UZTM) was supposed to master the manufacture of hulls and turrets for KV tanks in July 1941. UZTM had the necessary equipment to establish armored production, but the plant had no experience of such work. With great difficulties in July - August, UZTM began to ship its first KV hulls and towers to ChTZ.
At the beginning of July 1941, according to the order of the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry, a group of designers, technologists, foremen and workers was sent there by a special echelon from Leningrad to help organize tank production at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, carrying all the necessary technical documentation with them. In July and the first half of August, several trains with machine tools and equipment were exported from the Kirov plant to Chelyabinsk. From August 29, when the German troops closed the blockade ring, the evacuation continued by ships across Lake Ladoga, and from October - by air, with specially allocated aircraft. In just two months, over 11 thousand workers of the Kirov plant were evacuated from besieged Leningrad by air.
As a result, in September 1941, the production of heavy tanks was significantly reduced - the Kirov plant was evacuated, and the Chelyabinsk plant had not yet mastered the mass production of KV.
To remedy the situation, GKO decree No. 734 of October 4, 1941, as part of the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry, created the Ural Combine for the production of heavy KV tanks as part of ChTZ, UZTM, the Ural Turbine Plant and Plant No. 75 for the production of diesel engines (the latter was evacuated from Kharkov and included in ChTZ). By the same decree, ChTZ was renamed the Chelyabinsk Kirovsky Plant (ChKZ).
It should be noted that the name "Ural Combine for the Production of Heavy KV Tanks" did not catch on. This powerful tank plant soon received the unofficial name "Tankograd". Under this name he went down in history.
In parallel with the establishment of the production of heavy tanks in Chelyabinsk, the problem of their armament had to be solved. The fact is that the 76-mm F-32 guns, which were installed on the KV, were manufactured by the Kirov plant in Leningrad, which significantly reduced their production due to evacuation. The problem of artillery armament of the KV was solved quite quickly by putting into production the 76-mm ZIS-5 gun.
Work on its creation began in June 1940, when the design bureau of plant No. 92 under the leadership of V. Grabin received an assignment to design a cannon "with the ballistics of a 76-mm anti-aircraft gun (muzzle velocity 813 m / s) for a new heavy tank." Factory tests of the first sample, indexed F-27, began in December 1940. However, representatives of the Armored Directorate did not accept the gun, citing their decision by the fact that the long barrel of the gun, significantly protruding beyond the tank's size, would impair the KV's maneuverability on rough terrain. Therefore, in February 1941, the F-27 design (which received the ZIS-5 index at the beginning of 1941) was redesigned for the ballistics of the 76.2-mm F-22 field gun. At the same time, by order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense G. Kulik, the 76.2-mm F-34 gun mounted on the KV tank was successfully tested at plant No. 92 in February - March. But due to the fact that in the spring of 1941 a ZIS-5 gun with increased ballistics was expected for arming the KV, the armament of a heavy tank with the F-34 system was recognized as unpromising.
The first ZIS-5 sample was manufactured in August and was tested by the end of September. Upon their completion, in accordance with the requirements of the armored vehicle management and production conditions, the design of the ZIS-5 was redesigned. In its final form, the ZIS-5 had the ballistics of the F-34 and differed from the latter in the design of the cradle elements and the armored mask. On September 30, 1941, the ZIS-5 gun was put into service, and on October 1, its gross production began at factories # 92 and # 9.
To increase the production of KV at ChKZ, from October 1941 tractor production at the plant was completely discontinued and all workshops switched to the production of tanks. In addition, new workshops and sections were created, new production buildings were erected, many premises were expanded due to all kinds of extensions and superstructures. By high-speed methods, the construction of the former gas generator shop was completed and a large mechanical assembly building was built for tank production. The commissioning of these buildings made it possible to place on the factory premises the plant No. 75 for the production of diesel engines evacuated from Kharkov, which was included in the ChKZ. In addition, the factory premises accommodated the machine-tool plant named after V.I. Molotov from Kharkov, factories "Krasny Proletary" and grinding machines from Moscow. Gradually, on the site of tractor assembly lines, tank assembly lines arose, and the former tractor builders were retrained into tank builders.
Some factories and workshops located in the city of Chelyabinsk and the Chelyabinsk region were also attracted to help the ChKZ tank production for the machining of tank parts.
As a result of the reorganization of production, by January 1942, the manufacture of tanks at ChKZ was organized as follows: the MX-1 and MX-2 workshops produced parts and assemblies of the KV chassis and gears for the gearbox, the MX-2 workshop (before the war it was planned to deploy tank production) - parts of the main clutch, final drives, fans and gearboxes, the MX-4 workshop - turret swivel mechanisms, control drives, ball mounts of machine guns, etc., and the SB-2 assembly workshop was a workshop for the final assembly of tanks.
Wartime conditions dictated their own, more stringent requirements for production personnel. Leaders who did not believe in the success of the business or were unable to quickly reorganize were immediately removed from their posts and replaced by others, more energetic. At the same time, they did not pay attention to any previous merits, or to work experience, or to a diploma. The designers of the Chelyabinsk Tractor B. Arkhangelsky, M. Balzhi, N. Shvelidze, the designers-turbinists from the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, joined the designers evacuated from Leningrad headed by Zh.Kotin - N. Dukhov, A. Ermolaev, L. Sychev, E. Dedov. Kirovsky plant in Leningrad N. Sinev, G. Mikhailov, hydraulics specialists headed by Professor N.V. Voznesensky from Leningrad, engine specialists from Kharkov plant No. 75 I. Trashutin and J. Vikhman and many other specialists evacuated from different cities of the country ...
To fulfill the program for the production of tanks, delivered to ChKZ, it was necessary to drastically reduce the complexity of manufacturing the KV machine. The teams of designers and technologists have done a lot of work in this direction, as a result of which the time spent on the production of one tank has decreased from 11 647 hours (as of October 1) to 9007 hours by January 15, 1942 (for comparison: as of May 1 1941, the complexity of manufacturing the KV tank at ChTZ was 23,453 hours).
To expand the production of armored hulls for KV tanks by the decree of the State Defense Committee (GKO) dated November 13, 1941 No. 892 ss on the basis of the workshops of the plant No. 78 named. Ordzhonikidze created "an armored factory with the assignment of No. 200 to it and the inclusion of heavy tanks in the combine." M. Popov, who had previously headed the Izhora plant in Leningrad, was appointed director of the new plant. All this made it possible to provide the front with 110 KV tanks in November, and 213 in December.
At the same time, due to the rapid advance of the German army inland, the evacuation and loss of many industrial enterprises, problems arose with obtaining various parts and materials.
So, in October 1941, it turned out that the supply of diesel engines was running out, and their production in Chelyabinsk had not yet begun due to the unfinished evacuation of the Kharkov Diesel Engine Plant. The senior military representative at ChKZ A. Shpitanov suggested installing M-17 gasoline engines on the KV, which were previously installed on T-28 tanks (one hundred of these engines ended up in a warehouse of evacuated property). In a hurry, under the leadership of engineer N. Khalkiopov, drawings were made for the installation of the M-17 in the KV tank (signed on October 31, 1941), and soon the first tank with a gasoline engine went to sea trials. It turned out that the engine overheats a lot, and the tank can only move in low gears. However, there was no other way out and the decision was reported to Moscow. A decision followed to equip 100 KV tanks with M-17 gasoline engines. When transferred to the troops, each machine with the M-17 was accompanied by a special instruction with recommendations for operating a gasoline engine on a KV.
The author does not have data on how many gasoline engines received in total. It is only known for certain that on April 8, 1942, the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry signed an order "to replace the M-17 engines installed on KV tanks with V-2 engines."
Simultaneously with the installation of the M-17 on the KV, they began to install additional fuel tanks (five for each tank). The installation of the tanks made it possible to increase the range of tanks (both gasoline and diesel).
Since October 1941, at ChKZ, as far as possible, they began to replace particularly labor-intensive operations with simpler ones, to change the production technology of many components and assemblies. For example, balancers for the KV undercarriage were first forged and then machined on metal-cutting machines. Since November, they began to be made using hot stamping, after which all that remained was to drill the necessary holes.
In October, due to the evacuation of the State Bearing Plant from Moscow, ChKZ ceased to receive bearings. Then, at the suggestion of N. Dukhov, steel cages were installed on rollers cut from blanks of torsion shafts. This replacement of individual ball bearings with roller bearings turned out to be quite successful and allowed us to get out of the predicament.
Nevertheless, the production of KV tanks became more and more difficult. There was a shortage of radio stations, non-ferrous metals, rubber and much more. We had to look for a replacement for every missing unit and material. So, due to the lack of aluminum, since October 1941, radiators on KV tanks were made of steel pipes. The steel radiators were designed under the supervision of the turbine designer N. Sinev. In order to save rubber, the support and support rollers were made cast all-metal. Due to the lack of pressing equipment, solid-stamped track tracks were also transferred to casting.
The technology for the production of armored hulls has also changed. Some of the armor plate connections were transferred from rivets and goujons to welding, in order to save time and the machine park, they refused to gouge the edges of the armor plates after they were cut by gas cutting. From the beginning of 1942, on the part of the armored hulls, the upper bent stern sheet was made straight, and the cover of the engine compartment was made without stamping. In addition, in order to save expensive rolled products, along with welded ones, they switched to the production of cast towers.
Another interesting work carried out in 1941 was the experiments on the production of cast turrets and hulls for KV tanks. The initiative in this belonged to the deputy head of the armored department of the ABTU RKKA, military engineer 1st rank Alymov. The benefits of manufacturing by casting were obvious - savings in metal, unloading of scarce pressing and bending equipment, and the absence of welded seams. At the same time, cast parts (in comparison with those made of rolled armor) had a number of disadvantages - the possibility of hidden internal defects in the casting, its uneven thickness. The decision to manufacture cast towers was made in August 1940, and the Izhora and Mariupol factories, as well as a special technical bureau (STB) under the leadership of Rudakov, were involved in their manufacture. In October - November 1940, these enterprises cast six towers and one KV hull. From January 25 to February 5, 1941, the towers were tested by shelling and inspected by a special commission. According to the test results, the People's Commissar of Heavy Engineering A. Efremov reported to K. Voroshilov on March 13: “Based on the results of the work of the commission on cast towers, I consider it necessary to start serial production of KV towers:
a) at plant No. 78 - for KV-1;
b) at the Izhora plant and the Hammer and Sickle plant - for the KV-3.
However, this initiative was not supported, and all work on the cast towers was curtailed, and the one-piece KV hull was scrapped.
The issue of the production of cast turrets was returned only in December 1941, when there was an acute shortage of armor rental. Factory No. 200 hastily put into production a tower, the design of which was based on the cast tower of the Izhora factory, tested at the beginning of 1941. A little later, UZTM started the production of similar towers.
It should be avenged that, along with the advantages of cast structures compared to welded ones (savings in rolled products, no welding, unloading of scarce pressing equipment), they also had a number of disadvantages - uneven thickness and the possibility of various hidden defects inside. As a result, the shell resistance of cast armor was lower than that of katana. Therefore, the thickness of the cast tower of the KV tank was 110 mm (75 mm for the welded one). But, despite this, due to violations of the casting technology, lack of experience in such work, qualified personnel and the necessary materials for projectile resistance, cast towers, even of this thickness, were inferior to welded ones.
It should be noted that, despite the changes and simplifications introduced to the KV design, up to the termination of production of the KV-1 in the summer of 1942, the factories manufactured parts both according to old and new drawings in a wide variety of configurations. Everything depended on the availability of the necessary raw materials, materials and equipment. This is well illustrated by the "Report of the Commission for the Technical and Quantitative Inventory of Hulls and Towers for Orders No. 3000 and 30001, created in accordance with the order for the plant No. 197 dated April 2, 1942". According to this document, as of June 3, 1942, the ChKZ had the following number of armored hulls and towers:
"one. UZTM plant buildings:
a) hulls with a flat top stern sheet and a flat engine roof hatch - 200 pcs.
b) hulls with a flat top stern sheet and a convex engine roof hatch - 80 pcs.
c) hulls with a convex upper stern leaf and a flat engine roof hatch - 109 pcs.
2. Buildings of plant No. 200:
a) hulls with a flat top stern sheet and a convex engine roof hatch - 64 pcs.
b) hulls with a flat top stern sheet and a flat engine roof hatch - 13 pcs.
c) hulls with a convex upper stern leaf and a convex engine roof hatch - 2 pcs.
d) hulls with a convex upper stern leaf and a flat engine roof hatch - 66 pcs.
3. Towers of the UZTM plant:
a) riveted-welded parts. 57 (for the object KV-8) available - 20 pcs.
b) welded for serial machines det. 157 - 25 pcs.
c) cast weighted children. 257 - 166 pcs.
d) cast lightweight children. 957 - 89 pcs.
4. Towers of Plant No. 200:
a) welded for serial machines det. 157 - 4 pcs.
b) cast weighted children. 257 - 27 pcs.
c) cast lightweight children. 957 - 157 pcs. "
After the end of the war, the chief designer of the Ural Tank Plant AA Morozov wrote the following lines: “Unlike the supporters of any abstruse decisions, we proceeded from the fact that the design should be simple, not have anything superfluous, accidental and far-fetched. To make a complex machine, of course, is always easier than a simple one, which is far from every designer can handle ... The structural simplicity of the T-34 made it possible, at the most difficult moment for the Motherland, not only to have tanks, but to have a lot of them, much more than had the enemy. It made it possible to quickly organize the production of combat vehicles at many factories in the country that had not previously produced such equipment, and by the forces of people who previously knew about tanks only by hearsay. "
Everything is said accurately and correctly, but it requires one addition: the high adaptability of the T-34 tank is not an innate property, but acquired in the course of long and painstaking work.
An electric furnace for smelting flux AN-2. Plant for the production of T-34 tanks
Initially, the layout of the T-34 tank was a "tough nut to crack" for both metallurgists and machine builders, "History of Tank Building at the Ural Tank Plant No. 183 named after Stalin "reports:
“The design of armored parts for the T-34 at plant 183 was carried out without taking into account the technological capabilities and methods of manufacturing armored parts, as a result of which such details as a one-piece stamped nose, one-piece roof over the engine and others were designed, which would have been impossible to manufacture in mass production .. All major parts 40 and 45 mm thick on all butt-welded edges had quarters and locks that required gouging and milling. The tower consisted of separate, very complex stamped parts requiring complex machining. Part tolerances were such that all parts required machining on the edges. "
The hexagonal (nut) turret of the T-34 tank is being ground. Factory number 183, 1942.
The appearance of cast towers did not make things much easier: in Mariupol they were molded by hand in dry molds. The casting of one tower took 5-7 days and was impossible without high-quality molders.
The processing of the side parts turned out to be especially difficult: they needed planing machines with a table length of up to 7 m. The assembly and welding of the armored bodies was carried out on stands, which made it difficult to introduce automatic welding machines. The machine park consisted mainly of universal equipment designed for small series of machines. In general, as reported by the History of Tank Building, “... the production technology was designed for the availability of skilled workers who could machine complex tank parts in small batches on universal equipment, and the quality of processing depended on the qualifications of the worker.
The hexagonal turret of the T-34 tank is being turned. 1942 year
Engineering personnel, foremen and adjusters had experience in small-scale production. The equipment factor of technological processes was low ... which caused the presence of a significant amount of manual preparatory work on the assembly of units and machines ... The technological process was built on the principle of enlarged operations. The location of the equipment in the main tank department 100 was grouped, which created unnecessary cargo flows of parts. " In general, the production of T-34 tanks in Kharkov was mastered only thanks to the highest qualifications of workers and engineers.
In Nizhny Tagil, one could not even dream of such specialists.
Other decisions became urgent, namely, a sharp simplification of the design of the tank and the technologies for its manufacture. In the winter of 1941-1942. the technologists and design bureau of the N? l83 plant started a huge work that continued throughout the war and took place in the following areas:
Heat treatment of the turrets of the T-34 tank is in progress. 1942 year
"one. The maximum possible reduction of parts that are of secondary importance in the tank, the exclusion of which should not lower the technical and combat qualities of the vehicle.
2. Reduction of the normal parts used on the tank, both in quantity and in size.
3. Reduction of places to be machined on parts, with a simultaneous review of the cleanliness of the parts to be machined.
4. Transition to the manufacture of parts by cold stamping and casting instead of the applied hot stamping and forging.
5. Reduction of the range of parts requiring heat treatment, various types of anti-corrosion and decorative coatings or special surface treatment.
6. Reduction of assemblies and parts obtained in the order of cooperation from the outside.
7. Reduction of the range of grades and profiles of materials used for the manufacture of the tank.
8. Transfer of parts made from scarce materials to production from substitute materials.
9. Expansion, where it is allowed by working conditions, permissible deviations from technical conditions. "
Turning the shoulder strap of the T-34 tank turret at factory # 183. 1942 year.
By January 1942, changes were made to the drawings of 770 parts names, and 1265 part names were simply removed from the T-34 tank design. At the same time, despite the short time frame and the lack of experimental verification of the modified and new designs, no errors were subsequently identified! By the end of 1942, the number of discontinued parts had reached 6,237, and the range of fasteners had decreased by 21%. Parts and assemblies such as the driver's hatch, final drive housing, track links, instrument panel, shoulder straps for configuration and processing locations were simplified. During 1943, 638 more changes were made to the T-34 design, aimed at reducing labor intensity.
Cutting the teeth of the shoulder strap of the T-34 tank. Plant No. 183. 1942 year.
A prime example is the simplification of the technology for the manufacture of armor parts. At the end of 1941, the enterprises that produced T-34 tanks, one after another, began to abandon the machining of the welded edges. STZ and Plant No. 112 were the first to do this, followed by Plant No. 183. As a result, the labor intensity of manufacturing one set of armor parts decreased from 280 machine-hours at the Mariupol plant to 62 at the Ural tank plant, the number of finishing jobs decreased by 4 times, and the number of correct rolls by 2 times. In addition, after examining the variations in the dimensions of the parts during quenching, the workpieces were slightly modified so that the hardened parts were obtained within the drawing requirements, which again reduced their processing.
Automatic section of the plant normals shop. 1942 year.
During the war, German factories not only did not abolish the mechanical finishing of armor parts of tanks, but made it more complex and laborious. In the report of NII-48 on the topic "Clarification of the technology of welding the armor of German tanks" for 1944 it was indicated that if the first German tanks of the Pz. Kpfw I and Pz. Kpfw II, the welded parts were simply machined to fit together, starting with the Pz. Kpfw IV cutouts for lock connections appeared. On the Pz. Kpfw V has been used with spike, embedded spike and lock.
Note that there has always been a price to pay for simplifying technologies.
By carefully processing the edges of the armor parts and introducing complex joints, the German designers protected the weld from shock loads, especially when shells hit. Having abandoned milling and gouging of welded edges, Soviet technologists had to dramatically increase the strength of the weld itself. In other words, simplified technologies in one place required fundamentally new technological solutions in the neighboring limits. Let's talk about this in more detail.
Before plunging into the high technologies of Soviet tank building, let's turn our attention to metallurgy. Almost one hundred thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, manufactured in wartime, are, first of all, millions of tons of melted and carefully rolled armor steel. Recall that by the end of 1941, only one armored plant remained in service - Kulebaksky. The Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants and the Novo-Tagil metallurgical plant, newly attracted to armored production, had powerful open-hearth furnaces, but designed for the smelting of ordinary metal.
Automatic section of the plant normals shop (parts for T-34). 1942 year.
Perestroika took time, and the pre-war technology itself was slow and complex. Armored steel in the 1930s were cooked in open-hearth furnaces with sour hearth: either by a monoprocess from pure charcoal cast iron, or by a duplex process (main + sour furnace) from ordinary coke iron. Smelting armor metal in a single process in large open-hearth furnaces with a main hearth was considered impossible due to very strict requirements for its purity. Since little charcoal iron was produced in the USSR, the duplex process prevailed. Meanwhile, our rivals - German metallurgists - used the technology of smelting boone steel in the main furnaces even during the First World War. In the USSR, experiments of such melting were carried out under the direction of NII-48 at the Izhora, Mariupol and Kulebak plants in 1936 - 1940, but in relation to ship armor of large thicknesses, up to 330 mm, and in small open-hearth furnaces. The war forced us to abandon prejudices and indecision: as early as July 1941, at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, on the initiative and under the direction of NII-48, experiments began with the main process. The first melting was obtained on July 23, 1941. In September 1941, the main open-hearth furnace of high power of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine produced armor steel. In October, based on the data received, by order of the People's Commissar of Ferrous Metallurgy, all the production of armored steel grades in the USSR was transferred to the main process. Bottom line: the productivity of the existing units has almost doubled.
Cutting of gear teeth for the chassis of the T-34 tank. 1942 year
Having melted and rolled armor steel into sheets, metallurgists transferred their products to the armored hull shops of tank factories. Here, the sheet metal was cut according to a template into the corresponding parts.In the production of the T-34 tank, two hull parts were especially troublesome: the wing flaps (the inclined side of the side) and the vertical side sheet. Both of them were long, even in width strips with oblique cuts along the edges.
Accordingly, there was a proposal to roll a measuring strip equal in width to the finished parts.
For the first time, this idea was proposed by the armored cars of the Mariupol plant in the summer of 1941. The slabbing of the Zaporizhstal plant was intended for experimental rolling, where two echelons of armor ingots were sent. But then they did not have time to get down to business: the advancing German troops captured both the echelons and Zaporozhye itself.
Gear shaping. Production of T-34 tanks. 1942 year
At the turn of 1941-1942, during the evacuation and mastering the production of armor, there was not enough time at the new factories. However, in May 1942, the People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy again received an order to rent it for the T-34 and KV tanks. The task turned out to be difficult: the tolerances in width should not exceed -2 \u200b\u200b/ + 5 mm, the crescent shape (i.e., bending) for the total length of the part - 5 mm. Cracks, sunsets and delamination were not allowed at the edges in order to weld without machining or flame cutting.
Experimental work began simultaneously in the rolling shops of the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants, at first without any particular achievements. The rental of parts for KB tanks was soon abandoned, but the T-34 was eventually successful. The team of authors consisting of the head of the metallurgical department of the NII-48 G.A. Vinogradov, the chief engineer of the KMK L.E. Vaisberg and the engineer of the same plant S.E. Liberman during November 1942 - January 1943. obtained a high-quality strip by using a completely new method of edge-rolling on the "900" swaging stand of a rail and structural mill.
Shop shelf line. Production of T-34 tanks. 1942 year.
In January 1943, 280 strips were issued, in February - 486, in March - 1636. In April, after all the prescribed tests, the development of gross production of measuring strips for the wing flaps of T-34 tanks began. Initially, they were supplied to UZTM and the Ural Tank Plant, and then to other factories - manufacturers of T-34 tanks.
The scrap, which had originally been 9.2%, had dropped to 2.5% by October 1943, and the substandard strips were used for cutting into smaller pieces.
A complete and accurate assessment of the new technology is given by the corresponding report of NII-48 dated December 25, 1943: “A fundamentally new method of rolling a wide armor strip“ on the edge ”was developed, tested and introduced into gross production, which was considered unfeasible until recently in the USSR and abroad ... Obtaining a calibrated (black) strip, the size of the finished part of the armored hull of the T-34 tank, made it possible for the NKTP factories to adopt a new high-performance technology for the manufacture of armored parts, without cutting the longitudinal edges. Thanks to the application of the new method to one of the main armor parts of the T-34 tank (fenders), a very significant time saving (about 36%) has been achieved when cutting them out. Achieved savings of armor steel 8C up to 15% and oxygen savings of 15,000 cbm per 1,000 hulls.
It only remains to add that by the end of 1943, the rolling of a measuring strip was mastered for another part of the T-34 hull - the vertical side.
The distributors, as much as they could, facilitated the work of not only armored hulls, but also the machining shops of tank assembly plants.
The turret shoulder straps for T-34 tanks, manufactured in 1942 - 1945, had minimum allowances. on
banding mill of the Novo-Tagil Metallurgical Plant. The People's Commissar of the Tank Industry V.A.Malyshev, in his order of September 28, 1943, considered it necessary to express special gratitude to the Tagil metallurgists.
Boring of the gearbox housing of the T-34 tank. 1942 year.
The metallurgical production of tank factories (producing in particular T-34 tanks) was primarily associated with the casting of armor parts, mainly towers.
This technology was not something fundamentally new - a cast turret was installed on French Renault FT tanks of 1918 release. In the interwar period, French tank builders widely used cast turrets and hull parts on Renault R-35 and Hotchkiss light tanks. H-35 and medium S-35. Our Anglo-American allies did not neglect the armor casting - on the Mk II Matilda, Mk III Wallentine tanks, medium MZ and M4 tanks.
The reasons for this are clear and obvious: although cast armor has a lower durability compared to katana, large cast parts ultimately prove to be more reliable under shell fire due to the absence of weakened zones in the form of welded seams.
In addition, the armor casting was less laborious and made it possible to free up pressing, welding and other equipment necessary for processing armored parts made of rolled steel for other needs.
However, foundry technology had many subtleties.
Casting of parts with subsequent processing to low and medium hardness was considered relatively simple - as was the case on American and British tanks. The hardening of the casting to high hardness was more difficult. As already reported in the first chapter, in the USSR and Germany for the protection of medium tanks in the late 1930s. high hardness armor was chosen. Therefore, German metallurgists preferred not to take risks and until 1945 used castings only for small parts, such as gun masks or commander's turrets. Soviet tank builders took a conscious risk and, even before the war, began to master armored casting with subsequent hardening to high hardness. It all started with timid attempts in 1937-1938. casting of armored masks of the central turret of the T-35 tank at the Kharkov steam locomotive and Mariupol metallurgical plants.
Then, in 1938, a cast turret was made for the T-46-5, the first tank with anti-cannon protection in the USSR. In 1939-1940. experiments of armored casting was headed by NII-48, which made it possible by June 1941 to organize mass production for KB tanks - cast with bash and armored masks, for T-34 tanks - towers, nose beams, driver's hatch covers, protection of the DT machine gun, protection of the crankcase and bases viewing devices. By the end of the year, the turret of the T-60 light tank was added to this list.
Already during the Great Patriotic War, two major innovations were introduced in the production of cast T-34 towers. At the Ural Tank Plant, on August 15, 1942, the casting of the towers was introduced and the raw molds made by machine molding were introduced. This technology was developed and mastered by engineers I. I. Bragin and I. M. Gorbunov; it made it possible to increase the output of tower castings from 5-6 per day at the end of 1941 to 40 pieces at the end of 1942. Of course, NII-48 hastened to immediately distribute materials related to the use of machine molding throughout the industry.
Assembling the gearbox of the T-34 tank. 1942 year.
Approximately at the same time, starting from March 1942, at Uralmashzavod experiments of casting of towers into a chill mold took place. In addition to the convenience of production, this provided a greater anti-cannon resistance of the armor of the T-34 tank. In 1943, the new technology was introduced into serial production, first at UZTM, and then at factories # 174 and # 112. It only remains to add that the development of "Die-cast steel casting for tank building" (a group of authors led by Professor Nehenzi from NII-48) was presented in 1944 for the Stalin Prize.
But the technology of stamping tank turrets from rolled sheet, on which great hopes were pinned before the war, did not bring the desired effect. Let us recall that in 1941 the Mariupol plant had already started stamping towers for the T-34M tank; in Leningrad at the same time, they were preparing for the production of stamped towers for the super-heavy KV-3 tank (sheet thickness - 115 mm). The evacuation violated all plans, nevertheless, in 1943, UZTM workers - designer I.F. Vakhrushev and technologist V.S. Ananiev - adapted the design of the T-34 tower and created a method for stamping it on a 100-00-ton Shleman press. ... However, there were still not many stamped towers - 2050 (according to other sources - 2670) pieces. The press was constantly busy with other orders, so the casting orientation was more forward-looking.
T-34 tank gearbox is being tested. 1942 year.
Electric welding for joining armored structures attracted the attention of tank builders back in 1930, when a special experimental group appeared at the Izhora plant. Compared to the fastening of armor plates at the corners with rivets, the new technology looked more than attractive.
However, the path from intentions to serial production took several years: in the serial production of hulls and turrets of T-26 tanks, electric welding was introduced only in 1935, and for BT - by the beginning of 1937. The case was accompanied by a lot of difficulties: during the 1938 At the Izhora plant of the conference, technologists sadly stated that welded structures were damaged by cracks. The employees of NII-48, together with the metallurgists of the Izhora plant, had to adjust the composition of the 2P grade armor steel - only in order to improve its weldability.
Meanwhile, in 1940, employees of the Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (director - Academician E.O. Paton) managed to independently recreate the method of automatic welding under a layer of flux, patented in 1936 by the American company Linde. V.I.Dyatlov was engaged in the technology of the new process at the institute, the equipment was developed by P.I.Sevbo. However, both the Americans and the Patonov Institute used submerged arc welding to join common steel parts; for the welding of armor, the method needed serious improvement. At the beginning of 1941, scientists from NII-48, together with employees of the Izhora plant, took up this business.
By the summer, thanks to the introduction of ferrotitanium and ferrosilicon into the flux, it was possible to achieve a consistently high quality of the welded seam of armor structures. At the same time, with the help of special equipment produced by the "Electric" plant, automatic welding of several units of the T-50 tank was introduced into serial production.
A technological process for automatic welding of straight seams of the KB tank was also developed, but it was not possible to master it due to the evacuation of the enterprise.
In parallel with the Izhora Plant, automatic welding of armor under a layer of flux was introduced at the Kharkov Tank Plant No. 183. We do not know for sure whether the employees of the Research Institute-48 or the Electric Welding Institute were directly involved in this. It is only known for certain that the Kharkovites received the drawings of the machine from the Electric Welding Institute and independently manufactured three R-72 units. One of them was launched and used to weld the sides of the T-34 tank with the bottom of the fender liner; the other two did not have time to install before the plant was moved to Nizhny Tagil. According to the plant's director Yu. E. Maksarev, academician EO Paton was present at the test of the first Kharkov machine gun. The new method demonstrated excellent quality: when testing the welded structure by shell fire, it was not the seam that was broken, but the armor plate.
Line for processing suspension glasses of the T-34 tank. 1942 year.
At Uralvagonzavod, the first automatic welding installations appeared in the spring of 1941 and were intended for welding long carriage seams. After the outbreak of the war, the employees of the Electric Welding Institute did not waste their time and by October 1941 they were able to retool the R-70 units of carriage production for welding the sides of T-34 tanks.
On November 6, 1941, the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry V. A. Malyshev, being in Nizhny Tagil, signed order No. 0204/50, containing an instruction to all enterprises in the industry: “Due to the need to significantly increase the production of hulls for tanks in the near future and the lack of qualified welders at hull and tank factories, the only reliable means for ensuring the implementation of programs for hulls is the use of the already proven and tested at a number of factories automatic submerged-arc welding by the method of academician Paton. I consider it necessary in the near future for all directors of hull and tank factories to seriously engage in the introduction of automatic welding for the manufacture of tank hulls. "
During 1942-1943. The Electric Welding Institute, together with the employees of the armored hull department of the Ural Tank Plant, created a whole complex of automatic machines of various types and purposes. In 1945 UTW used the following auto-welding machines:
Universal type for welding straight longitudinal seams;
- universal self-propelled carts;
- simplified specialized carts;
- installations for welding circular seams with a stationary product;
- Installations with a carousel for rotating the product when welding circular welds;
- self-propelled units with a common drive for feeding electrode wire and moving the head for welding seams on bulky structures.
In 1945, automatic machines accounted for 23% of welding (by weight of deposited metal) on the hull and 30% on the T-34 tank turret.
Assembling the radiators of the T-34 tank at the factory # 183. 1942 year.
The use of automatic machines made it possible already in 1942 only at one plant No. 183 to release 60 qualified welders, and in 1945 - 140. A very important circumstance: the high quality of the seam during automatic welding eliminated the negative consequences of refusing to mechanically process the edges of armor parts.
On welding machines, according to the memoirs of Academician E.O. Paton, “a student of a theatrical technical school, a mathematics teacher from a rural school, a collective farm shepherd from Dagestan, a cotton grower from Bukhara, an artist from a Ukrainian town ... worked on welding the towers of the T-34 tank ... from the Mari Autonomous Republic. I remember how they first appeared in the workshop. They were led by the foreman, showed the installations and explained what we were doing here, and the girls huddled together, looked in dismay at the cranes carrying the huge carcasses of tank corps over their heads, plugged their ears from the rumble in the workshop.
In the eyes of one of them, I saw tears. They first came to the plant, and even one like that, and were thoroughly scared ...
Girls from the Kursk region were put on the automatic welding of the sides (here, obviously, an inaccuracy crept into the memories of EO Paton. According to the factory documents, these girls were evacuated from the Kalinin region - author's note). They were very lively, intelligent and competent, they quickly got used to their work, they always laughed and sang a lot. They got brooms and brushes and kept their jobs with a purely feminine neatness. Not fulfilling the plan was their biggest grief, but this rarely happened.
As a rule, somewhere in the machine, in a place inaccessible to prying eyes, these wonderful girls hung an intricate bow or a picture cut from a magazine. Age took its toll ...
The young men worked mainly on the welding of the nose assemblies, on the welding of mine pipes and on the conveyor. There were a lot of guys from Ukraine who were forced to become adults at once by the war ..,. Some of our fellow countrymen were very short. To reach the control panel, they put boxes under their feet. At first it was very difficult for them, but they behaved bravely and proudly, did not want to lag behind their fathers who worked at the same plant, and showed special persistence. "
Installation of cannon armament on the t-34 tank
Meanwhile, V.I.Dyatlov somewhere at the turn of 1942-1943. was transferred to UZTM, where he continued to work on the development of submerged-arc welding technology. From the memorandum "On the organization of research work on automatic welding" signed by the chief engineer of the NII-48 engineer EE Levin, it follows that during 1942-1943. Dyatlov created and implemented the following improvements:
"one. The method of automatic welding with two wires (proposed by V.I.Dyatlov and B.A.Ivanov), which made it possible to eliminate cracks in the T-34 armor during automatic welding.
2. Apparatus for automatic welding with a constant feed rate of the electrode wire (proposal of V. I. Dyatlov), which greatly simplifies the apparatus, which makes it possible to manufacture it by the factories themselves.
3. The method of flux-arc welding (proposal of VI Dyatlov and GD Knyazkov), simplifying the power equipment. "
It only remains to add that in the USA automatic submerged-arc welding was used in armored production in 1944. In Germany, automatic welding machines appeared only at the very end of the war, before that only manual welding was used. In a corresponding study, NII-48 noted its good quality, which, of course, required the highest qualifications of welders.
Post-war surveys of German tank factories showed not only the vastness, but also the high technical perfection of their machine tool park. As noted by J. Forti: “The Germans managed to achieve a special art in the creation of special machines, with the help of which a lot of quick-clamping and multi-place devices was perfected. The use of single-pass modular broaches by the designer Nickelberg for the manufacture of gears increased productivity several times. Multi-spindle drilling heads have reduced the labor intensity of the drilling operation on the fan assembly by 55%.
Installation of V-2 diesel engines on T-34 tanks.
Additional adaptations and adjustments for machine tools were carried out in Nizhny Tagil by technologists of the Moscow Machine-Tool Plant named after I. Ordzhonikidze. Only in 1941-1942. they carried out 325 adjustments, which made it possible to establish a stable production of very important transmission and chassis parts for the thirty-fours. In 1943, the work was continued by the tank builders' own forces: the annual report reads: “Simple and easy-to-maintain device designs made it possible to rebuild the technology of parts, differentiate and simplify operations as much as possible. In the reporting year 1943, the production received high-performance tooling. This tooling introduced a new technology to the production of the plant. It has become a common requirement of technologists and production workers for the design of multi-cutter adjustments, combined dies, quick-clamping and multi-place fixtures.
The help of the allies gradually affected: during 1942-1943. at UTZ, high-performance machine tools became more and more widespread: special modular, multi-cutter and multi-spindle. Their total number by the end of 1943 had grown to 227 units - against 51 in Kharkov. At the same time 132 obsolete machines were modernized.
The main advantage of the Soviet tank-building enterprises, and above all of the Ural Tank Plant, was the complete transfer of all main shops to the flow-conveyor method of work on the assembly of T-34 tanks.
If we talk about mechanical assembly shops, then initially their production sites in Nizhny Tagil were organized, as in Kharkov - on the principle of a complete cycle of work. However, such a system was effective only with small-scale assembly of machines and the availability of skilled workers. Therefore, already in 1942, painstaking work was carried out in all shops to break down production operations into the simplest components available to almost untrained workers. This was followed by the "alignment" of the equipment in the order of the sequence of operations, that is, in the form of production lines.
Installation of a tower with a 76-mm cannon on the T-34 tank. 1942 year
Almost the only way out for our factories was to increase the productivity of available universal machines by introducing new tools and special adjustments. The report of the Ural Tank Plant for 1942 states: “For the manufacture of many parts, a completely new original technology and new techniques were used that were not previously used in tank construction: the widespread use of multi-cutter cutting, inline milling, widespread use of broaching, the introduction of modular specialized machines .. . introduction of high-performance adjustments on turret lathes and automatic machines. "
At the end of 1942, the leadership of the NKTP appealed to the government with a request to involve specialists from the cutting department of the Moscow State Technical University named after V.I. Bauman. They have already distinguished themselves at the factories of the People's Commissariat of Arms by proposing a different sharpening of the cutting tool. The machine shops of UTW were chosen as an experimental base for the development of tools with rational geometry of cutting edges. For this purpose, a team of researchers was created from local technologists, employees of the branch institute of VGSPI and, naturally, representatives of the Moscow Higher Technical School. The very first months of joint work in the winter - summer of 1943 demonstrated complete success: cutters, drills and milling cutters had 1.6 - 5 times greater durability and made it possible to increase the productivity of machine tools by 25-30%.
T-34 assembly conveyor. 1942 year.
Developed by scientists from the Moscow Higher Technical School and employees of plant No. 183, "Guidelines for the geometry of cutting tools" were approved as mandatory for use at all NKTP plants (91).
The own innovators of the Ural Tank Plant were also distinguished by their creative approach to business. In 1943 alone, the head of the bureau of rationalization and inventions V.A.Nachitel developed and for the first time in the USSR introduced a modular cutter with plug-in knives, engineer Yunkin created a progressive cutting broach.
After the first three production lines, 64 more were created in 1943, 67 in 1944, and 17. In total, as of January 1, 1946, 151 production lines operated at UTZ. The following example testifies to the efficiency of production lines: for the manufacture of the T-34 final drive gear in 1942, before the introduction of the production line, 39 machines and 70 workers were required, and in 1945, on a streamlined flow, 19 machines and 27 workers. For some particularly complex units, automatic production lines were developed. So, for processing the rear axle of the T-34, after welding it into the body, in 1943 an automatic line of 14 units was developed and installed
Shop for delivery of T-34 tanks. 1942 year.
Despite the apparent simplicity, this work demanded tremendous efforts from technologists and incredible accuracy of calculations. The report of UTW for 1943 states: “The transition to the flow organization of the production process required the following maximum preparation of production:
a) Revision of blanks, possible rationalization and simplification of it, reduction of allowances.
b) Revision of processing technology, possible differentiation of operations in relation to the required rhythm and their simplification, designed for the use of unskilled workers.
c) Standardization of technical processes and selection of the required equipment, specialized in operations, and equipping it with as simple equipment as possible.
d) Layout of equipment along the flow, ensuring the processing of the part without "loops"
e) Solving the issues of technical control of the product and its location.
f) Providing the production line with the minimum necessary vehicles, choosing these means, organizing workplaces, providing them with inventory and small mechanization (tool boxes, carts, etc.) ...
The first stage on the way to the transition to the flow organization of production sections and lines at our plant was the organization of mechanical assembly shops according to the principle of finished production ... These shops supply finished units to the main assembly conveyor ... The next stage was the rejection of the group arrangement of machines. When the equipment was grouped, the “face of the part” was lost, the beginning and end of processing was not visible, planning the release of parts and monitoring the schedule were extremely difficult. At the same time, the details made large "loops", the cargo traffic as a whole was confused, a large number of transport workers and means were required. It was not enough to arrange the machines in order of operations. In all cases, the success of the in-line production method was inextricably linked with the rise to a new higher level of technology for processing T-34 parts and the organization of the production site. "
It only remains to add that the main "ideologist" of the production lines at the UTZ was the chief technologist of the enterprise M. E. Katz.
Adjustment and tuning of the T-34. 1942 year.
If production lines were created for the machining of parts and assemblies of the T-34 tank, then the assembly line reigned supreme. The invention of American automobile manufacturers was used at the tank factories of the USSR since the early 1930s. In particular, the first conveyor in Kharkov was created in 1932 for the production of BT-2 tanks. In Nizhny Tagil, the assembly line for T-34 tanks went into operation on January 7, the second - on April 1, 1942. Later, at the beginning of 1944, the reduction in the assembly cycle of vehicles made it possible to abandon the second assembly line and concentrate all forces on one.
What was the assembly line? It was a system with intermittent movement, similar to the car conveyor previously operating at UVZ, with two preparatory sections. On the first, the hull of the T-34 tank was installed on stands where electrical equipment, tanks, suspension, tubes and brackets for the engine were mounted. In the second section, the body was lifted onto the trestles for the convenience of installing track rollers with balancers, guide wheels and front suspensions. Further, the body on its wheels moved to the conveyor belt and was included in a moving production line. As the machine advanced, final drives, control drives, gearboxes, an engine, fuel, oil and air systems were installed on it, prepared outside the conveyor line.
The entire assembly process included 8 preparatory units of work performed up to the conveyor in two preparatory sections, and 35 assembly positions for work directly on the conveyor. The work of the workers was facilitated by the use of electric wrenches, pneumatic machines and other means of mechanization.
On the conveyor belt, the cars were filled with fuel, oil and water.
After adjustment, the tanks were transferred to stands for stationary testing. The machine was closed and mounted on the tracks on a separate delivery conveyor.
Conveyor assembly was also known in Germany. J. Forti reports: “In German mechanical engineering, an efficient conveyor method of production was widely used. Each T-34 tank was moved around the workshop using a crane or special trolleys, going through a series of successive stages of assembly and processing, finally leaving the conveyor and sent to testing and running in. "
Tanks T-34-76 are loaded onto the train and are sent to the front. 1942 year.
But the conveyor belt in armored hull production was a purely Soviet invention and was first implemented in Nizhny Tagil, on the initiative of the director of plant No. 183 Yu. E. Maksarev.
The order to create a conveyor for welding armored hulls was signed on December 10, 1941, but its implementation was delayed for a number of reasons. Construction was completed in early May, and after a series of experiments, the conveyor entered commercial operation on June 1. In January 1943, the same began to operate for assembling and welding the nose of the tank hull. In the book "History of Tank Building at the Ural Tank Plant N9183" we find an exhaustive description of these systems: "The conveyor for welding the hulls is a normal track of a railway track 98 m long. There are 26 Diamond wagon bogies on this track with a spring coupling. .. All trolleys have the same profile to accommodate the bodies in all four welding positions.
A tractor winch is installed in front of the conveyor, which moves all the bogies at the same time to one workplace. The front carriage, freed from the body, is transported by a crane to the beginning of the conveyor and coupled to the rest of the carts. The rhythm of the conveyor is 44 minutes.
The organization of work is regulated by the technological process, which provides for 4 positions of the T-34 tank hull on the conveyor:
1. Normal position.
2. Position on the right side.
3. Position "upside down".
4. Position on the left side.
In each of these positions, several trolleys are occupied, depending on the volume of welding work and the number of simultaneously working welders ... There are special places for turning the T-34 body to the next position ... The body is removed from its place, turned over on the floor with an overhead crane and put on next cart in new position ...
The conveyor for assembly and welding of the T-34 hull nose assembly is a lattice-type metal structure carrying horizontally reinforced squares along the entire conveyor. The horizontal shelves of these squares serve as a support for the rolling of the rollers, on which an endless Gall chain with a pitch of 200 mm rests. The conveyor moves periodically every 44 minutes. Support channels are welded to the chain links with a pitch equal to the width of the nose, on which the nose assembly is laid. They protect the supporting structure from rubbing against protruding parts. The technological process of assembly and welding provides for 15 operations of equal labor intensity. "
History of Soviet tank building 1941-1945 irrefutably proves the fact that the lack of material resources is in no way an insurmountable obstacle in competition with a more powerful opponent. True, with the obligatory condition that intellectual resources are available. We will not go into excessive pathos and give the right to a final conclusion to a person who is impartial in this respect, namely, the American Stephen Zaloge: “The Soviet philosophy of tank design was obviously focused on creating an inexpensive and reliable design, devoid of any decoration. This pragmatic approach meant that the Soviet Union was able to significantly outnumber Germany in the number of tanks built throughout the war, despite a much weaker production base due to the huge losses in 1941. It was the industrial successes that ensured the victory of the Soviet Union in the Second World War ”.
Data source: a quote from the book "Combat vehicles UralVagonMashzavod: T-34"
Sergey Ageev
There is no need to talk about how important and holy Victory Day on May 9 is for our country. And how great a role in the common cause of victory in the Great Patriotic War was played by the defense industry, which was able to technologically and productively not only resist, but also surpass the seemingly inexhaustible defense and technical capabilities of the Hitlerite coalition. The famous "Uralmashzavod" - "plant of factories" played a special role in the creation of military equipment for the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Having carried out the transition from peaceful products to defense products in the shortest possible time, the enterprise became the country's main forge for the production of tank hulls and self-propelled guns, howitzers, etc. This year "Uralmashzavod" celebrates its 80th anniversary, the heroic pages of the Great Patriotic War - one of the brightest in the biography of not only the enterprise itself, but the entire national industry. It is important that the great traditions of industrial victories are preserved in our time, and thanks to the main shareholder of the enterprise - Gazprombank - they act as a serious historical context for improving technologies and mastering new products. The modernization implemented at the enterprise with the participation of Gazprombank gives grounds to assert that Uralmashzavod, which has a great past, has no less significant opportunities in the present and in the future.
Very high importance
The significance of Uralmashzavod during the Great Patriotic War was so high that its production activities were personally controlled by Vyacheslav Molotov and Lavrenty Beria, and the work plan was approved directly by Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin.
The widespread notion that Uralmash produced tanks during the war years is a persistent historical delusion. In fact, the role of the plant in the military-industrial complex during the Great Patriotic War was much broader and more significant.
Tanks ("thirty-fours") were produced by the plant from September 1942 to August 1943. During this time, 706 of them were manufactured. Then Uralmash produced only self-propelled artillery mounts based on the T-34 tank: SU-122, SU-85 and SU-100. There were 4846 made of them, and no other plant in the USSR made such. But the 5,552 Uralmash combat vehicles are only 14% of all medium tanks and self-propelled guns manufactured by the Soviet military-industrial complex during the Great Patriotic War.
The merits of "Uralmashzavod", and very great, are completely different. In the People's Commissariat of the tank-building industry, the plant was responsible for the production of armored hulls for tanks and self-propelled artillery installations. Hulls for medium and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns were supplied to Krasnoe Sormovo, to plant No. 183 (now Uralvagonzavod), to the Kirov plant in Chelyabinsk (later to the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant) and other enterprises. And it was really large-scale production: during the war years, the plant produced 19,225 armored hulls. That is, more than half of the medium and heavy Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns during the war had Uralmash armored hulls.
But the point is not even the number of cases, although this is very important. The main thing is that the plant had to master the release of new serial products every six months - armored hulls of T-34, KV-1, KV-1s, IS-2, IS-3 tanks, SU-122, SU-85, SU-100, ISU self-propelled guns. -122, ISU-152. And often the new housings differed significantly from the previous ones both in design and in steel grades, which caused great difficulties in organizing the production of metallurgical blanks. No other enterprise of the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry faced such problems. For example, plant No. 183 and Krasnoye Sormovo produced only thirty-fours, while the Kirov plant in Chelyabinsk specialized mainly in heavy vehicles.
Mastering new technologies
A special page of the labor feat of the Uralmash workers is the development of new technologies, which, in fact, ensured the implementation of colossal plans for the production of defense equipment. And, perhaps, the most significant successes in this area were achieved by Uralmash metallurgists.
According to authoritative experts, in the four war years, the plant metallurgists have advanced 20 years in their technologies, ahead of not only Soviet, but also foreign foundry workers. The company knew this for sure, including because, according to the order of the plant director, all the designers and technologists carefully studied the new German armored vehicles that came from the battlefields to Uralmash for remelting. And this analysis showed that German technology is seriously lagging behind. So, for example, until the very end of the war on German tanks and self-propelled guns did not appear a single cast part made of armor steel.
Now many historians are perplexed: “The Soviet Union produced many times more tanks than Germany with all the satellites, and Soviet tank building consumed less rolled armor! How so?". And it is unaware to some that cast armor provided not only savings in very scarce rolled products, but also sharply reduced the complexity of manufacturing combat vehicles, their cost. This ensured the superiority of the Soviet tank industry in terms of the quantity and quality of military equipment produced.
The armor is strong!
At "Uralmashzavod" the development of smelting of armored steel grades for tank parts began in 1941 with the 8C grade, the development was carried out jointly with specialists from NII-48 and the Izhora plant. This brand was created at the "Izhora plant" before the war, where armor plates were rolled from it on a rolling mill, from which the towers and hulls of KV tanks were then welded.
The first experiments of using 8C steel for cast towers (by the way, the first in the world) at Uralmash were unsuccessful. The metal turned out to be dense with a good break, the turrets had a good surface, without cracks, but did not withstand field tests (shelling from anti-tank guns). All efforts aimed at increasing the survivability of the tower, cast from sour steel, have led nowhere. Sour steel, possessing, as metallurgists say, "dryness", turned out to be unsuitable for the production of cast towers. Then began experimental melting of armor steel in the main open-hearth furnaces. Back in the pre-war years, this technology was introduced at the "Izhora plant". These towers began to meet all military acceptance requirements.
In 1942, Uralmashzavod was also commissioned to produce armored hulls for T-34 tanks, and another brand of armor steel, 70L, was used in production. Both grades were not interchangeable, which hindered the production flexibility of the steelmaking and foundries. The requirement for 8C steel (for heavy tanks), as a rule, was less than the charge in the furnace, and the remaining steel was poured into molds and made into ingots. At the same time, there was not enough liquid metal for shaped casting.
In addition, 70L steel castings required a very complex heat treatment regime, and in order to fulfill the ever-increasing plans, new heat-treatment furnaces had to be built. In addition, casting and quenching cracks were formed in 70L steel castings more often than in 8C steel castings. These reasons prompted the metallurgists of Uralmash to search for a new grade of armor steel, the castings of which would not require such a complex heat treatment regime. This is how armor steel of high hardness 72L appeared, from which all the main tank parts were cast for the experiment. Laboratory tests have shown that casting and quenching cracks are reduced. Field tests demonstrated the quite satisfactory quality of the armor plating, and the 72L steel was not only approved by the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry and the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, but also recommended to other tank-building plants.
At the same time, one must understand that the Uralmash steelworkers had a very difficult time at that time, since they lacked the most necessary materials. But there has not been a case of steelmaking furnaces stopping due to a shortage. Doctor of Technical Sciences Dmitry Butakov, who worked at Uralmash in those years, recalls: “There is no cast iron - they used a scrap-carburetor process, they replaced the cast iron with an electrode strike, anthracite. The lack of ferromanganese was compensated for by manganese reduced from the slag using manganese ore. When there was a shortage of fuel oil, open-hearth furnaces were heated with diesel fuel. "
An interesting fact: Dmitry Badyagin worked as the chief metallurgist at Uralmash during the war years, who before that was the chief metallurgist of the Izhora plant. He supported the experiments of the Uralmash people to create a cast turret, even despite the categorical ban of one of the leading employees of the tank industry People's Commissariat.
The objection seemed to be based on the obvious fact: cast armor is more "loose", less resistant to shells. This means that the tower will be thicker, it will weigh more, which is unacceptable. But thanks to the new shape of the cast tower, which was invented by the Uralmash workers, its weight characteristics did not go beyond the permissible parameters, and the quality of the cast towers turned out to be even higher than the welded ones. By the way: during the war years Dmitry Badyagin became twice a laureate of the Stalin Prize - moreover, both prizes were awarded to him by one decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: for the foundry "breakthrough" and for the development of a new brand of armor steel. By the way, in September 1944 Dmitry Badyagin was sent back to Kolpino to restore the Izhora Plant. And this is just one of the facts showing the historical unity of the country's two leading enterprises.
Another important task that Uralmash solved during the war years was to obtain castings with minimum allowances for machining. This was extremely important not only from the point of view of metal savings. The main and greatest savings for the plant were achieved due to a decrease in the volume of machining, the consumption of scarce and expensive cutting tools and, consequently, with an increase in the productivity of equipment and the throughput of machining shops.
The results were simply brilliant: some parts, despite tight dimensional tolerances, were cast with such precision that they were not machined at all.
“The part of the self-propelled gun“ nose ”, despite its large dimensions (1600x1200x750 mm), the complexity of the configuration and strict requirements in terms of adherence to tolerances for both overall dimensions and body thickness, was cast completely without further machining. It took 17 hours to machine the same part at another plant. 40 minutes, ”the military representatives noted.
In the same way, the Uralmash workers abandoned the machining of another basic part - the “cradle” of artillery guns. Previously, they were obtained by machining from large press forgings. During the war, machines began to be used only to achieve the fitting dimensions of these parts.
Duplex process and other tricks
And all the same, there was not enough metal, all the possibilities for increasing the production of liquid steel were exhausted, it was necessary to save it. The greatest contribution to this matter was made by specialists from the central plant laboratory. Their research showed that for the production of artillery barrels it is possible to use steel grade ОХН1М instead of ОХН3М and at the same time the metal meets all technical requirements. Further improvement of technology made it possible to improve the quality of the metal from month to month. Fusion control in the first half of 1944 recorded the yield of good metal in the amount of 91.8%, and from July 1 to November 1, 1944 - 97%. At the same time, the cost of one ton of artillery steel, thanks to the savings in nickel, decreased by 40-50%.
Sometimes metallurgists made very risky decisions. For example, in 1944, the duplex process was canceled for the production of artillery steel, which made it possible to sharply, by almost 40 thousand tons, increase the production of basic steel. The quality of artillery pieces did not deteriorate from this, and this testifies to the unusually high skill of the Uralmash metallurgists.
Another important direction of Uralmashzavod's activity during the Great Patriotic War was the production of blanks for artillery. Then the Artillery Plant No. 9 named. Stalin (the former special production of Uralmashzavod) annually produced about 7.5 thousand field and tank guns. Casting and forgings were provided by Uralmash. Moreover, much more liquid steel was used for artillery blanks than for armored hulls of tanks and self-propelled guns. However, already in 1941, the production of liquid steel at Uralmashzavod increased by a third compared to 1940 - up to 134 thousand tons. This was due to the fact that furnace No. 4 was put into operation - the largest in the Urals and Siberia sour open-hearth furnace with a charge 70 tons (later its capacity was increased to 100 tons). Then in 1942, 1943 and 1944. the plant installed three electric furnaces for smelting steel.
M-30 - the legendary howitzer of the Great Patriotic War
There were enough problems with solving the most complex defense-industrial tasks ... So, it was very difficult at Uralmash to master the production of the M-30 howitzer, whose manufacturability and simplicity are noted by almost all artillerymen. At the first stage, the marriage of artillery casting reached 45%. There is nothing surprising in this: thin-walled steel casting, which was common at artillery factories, was only being mastered at Uralmash. No one then dared to dream that very little time would pass and the M-30 howitzers would come from Uralmash in thousands, becoming the favorite weapon of the troops. During the war, one of them reached a unique combat score - about 18 thousand shots! After a thorough examination, to everyone's amazement, it turned out that the gun had not lost its combat qualities and was quite suitable for further use.
And then - at the beginning of development - in 1940, "Uralmash" managed to release only 200 guns, which was far from meeting the plan. The production of the M-30 was then even assigned temporarily to another plant (Gorky Plant No. 92 in 1940 produced 500 guns, which came in handy with the beginning of the war).
The main part of the problems with artillery production at Uralmash was solved already in 1941, when the plant produced 2,760 howitzers against the plan of 2,000. Moreover, in the second half of the year, they were produced at 300 units per month! Thus, the first serious "battle" with the designers of Germany was won: throughout the war, the Nazi troops were armed with a much less effective 105-mm divisional howitzer.
In October 1941, Uralmash was given an additional task: to produce 600 76-mm F-32 and F-34 tank guns per month without reducing the production of M-30. In addition, artillery plant No. 8 (later - ZIK) was evacuated from the Podlipki near Moscow to Sverdlovsk. Its main production was located in unfinished workshops, and the assembly of anti-aircraft guns was organized at Uralmash.
In February 1942, the State Defense Committee decided to separate the artillery production of "Uralmashzavod" into a separate enterprise subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Armaments. But it remained organically connected with Uralmash: the metallurgical workshops of Uralmashzavod provided plant No. 9 with blanks, and since the fall of 1942, the latter was completing Uralmash armored vehicles with powerful weapons. All emerging issues were resolved clearly and promptly.
Fighters "Tigers"
It is clear that the small number of KB-9 at the beginning of the war was overloaded beyond measure. But it was then that the designer F.F. Petrov had the idea of \u200b\u200bequipping a medium tank with an M-30 howitzer. The idea seemed fantastic: a divisional howitzer ... in a medium tank! But the calculations showed: the T-34 tank will withstand, but it will be necessary to abandon the tower, replace it with a fixed wheelhouse. At the same time, another idea appeared: to install a 152-mm howitzer-gun on the KV tank.
In Moscow, at first, it was considered premature to create a self-propelled gun with a powerful weapon. The designers of the plant were offered to undertake the detailed development of the project in their free time from the main work (and then there was free time only at night). There were many volunteers. And soon a task was received from the People's Commissariat of Armaments for the manufacture of a prototype of a self-propelled artillery installation.
Interestingly, the very first battery SU-122 with an M-30 howitzer based on the T-34 tank (with a wheelhouse) during tests in the late autumn of 1942 near Leningrad collided with the first six Tigers and all six were destroyed from an ambush. This fact alarmed the German command and "Tigers" instead of serial production were upgraded, which delayed their mass production until the summer of 1943.
The ML-20 howitzer-cannon was also used in combat vehicles: first on the KV-1S tanks (SU-152), then on the IS-2 (ISU-152). These heavy self-propelled guns were produced in Chelyabinsk, but Uralmash made armored hulls for them. SU-152s appeared on the battlefields just in time - by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the designers of Germany managed to create new models of powerful armored vehicles. They were successfully opposed by the Uralmash SU-122 and the Chelyabinsk SU-152. The front-line soldiers nicknamed these machines "St. John's wort": their power was such that the shells demolished the towers of enemy tanks.
But it was necessary to look ahead, create even more powerful weapons, because the duel with the best designers in Europe was not over yet. And so the designers in a short time create 85-mm tank guns D5-85S (for self-propelled guns) and D5-85T (for T-34 and IS tanks). The D5-85S gun went through state tests brilliantly: its projectile pierced the frontal armor of the "tiger" (130 mm) and, having passed through the entire tank, tore out a sheet of aft armor.
Then the 122mm D25T cannon was developed. The power of the gun has increased by 5.3 times compared to the 76 mm cannon! They began to install it on heavy tanks IS-2. Moreover, the development of the prototype was almost not required - only the muzzle brake was strengthened (the Uralmash metallurgists successfully coped with this task).
Fantastic terms (less than a month!) Were given to Plant No. 9 to create a new 152-mm howitzer. It's hard to believe, but they met the deadline, creating the D-1 gun, the firepower of which was 80% higher than the M-30. The D-1 howitzer was put into mass production even before the start of the Battle of Kursk, where it showed itself in the best possible way.
At the beginning of 1944, another masterpiece was developed - the D10 cannon with an initial projectile speed of 900 m / s. The new product was maximally unified with the D25 cannons and was put into service in July. This cannon was installed on the SU-100 Uralmash self-propelled gun, the power of which increased 2.1 times compared to the SU-85, and the distance at which the Tiger was hit increased from 850 m to 3 km. Experts consider the SU-100 to be the best self-propelled gun of the Second World War. In memory of the war, the last of them, manufactured at Uralmash, was installed not far from the factory entrance.
Many samples of military equipment and weapons used during the Great Patriotic War passed it from start to finish, which indicates the success of their design and the most complete compliance with tactical and technical requirements (TTT). However, a number of products of the Soviet defense industry, with which the Red Army entered into confrontation with the German troops, did not survive until its completion due to either obsolescence or inconsistency with this most notorious TTT. But the same fate was shared by some combat vehicles created during the war, including the light tank T-60.
Counteroffer
In May 1941, the Moscow plant number 37 received the task to master the serial production of the new generation light tank T-50, which shocked the management of the enterprise, whose modest production capabilities clearly did not correspond to the new facility. Suffice it to say that the T-50 had a complex planetary eight-speed gearbox, and gear cutting production has always been a weak point at this plant. At the same time, the workers of plant number 37 came to the conclusion that it is possible to create a new light tank for direct support of the infantry. At the same time, it was assumed to use the spent engine-transmission unit and the chassis of the T-40 amphibious tank. The hull was supposed to have a more rational shape, reduced dimensions and enhanced booking.
Convinced of the feasibility and advantages of such a solution, the chief designer N.A.Astrov, together with the senior military representative of the enterprise, Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Okunev, wrote a letter to I.V. Stalin, in which he substantiated the impossibility of producing the T-50 tank and, on the other hand, the reality of a quick mastering the production of a new tank. The letter in the established manner was dropped in the evening into a mailbox at the Nikolsky Gate of the Kremlin, at night Stalin read it, and in the morning the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.A.Malyshev arrived at the plant and was instructed to work on the new machine. He examined the mock-up of the tank with interest, approved it, discussed technical and production problems with the designers, and advised replacing the DShK machine gun with a much more powerful 20-mm ShVAK automatic cannon, which was well mastered in aviation.
Already in the evening of July 17, 1941, a decree of the State Defense Committee No. 179 "On the production of light T-60 tanks at the plant No. 37 of the People's Commissariat for Sreda" was signed. It should be noted that this resolution was not about the classic "sixty", but about the T-60 (030) tank, outwardly identical to the T-40 except for the rear hull sheet and better known under the unofficial designation T-30.
For the T-60 (already in version 060), the designer A.V. Bogachev designed a fundamentally new, more durable all-welded hull with a significantly smaller booked volume and a low silhouette than that of the T-40 - a height of only 1360 millimeters, with large angles of inclination of the frontal and stern sheets made of rolled homogeneous armor. Smaller hull dimensions made it possible to increase the thickness of all frontal plates to 15–20 millimeters, and then with the help of shielding to 20–35, side plates - up to 15 millimeters (subsequently up to 25), aft plates - up to 13 millimeters (then in places up to 25). The driver was located in the middle in a forward-protruding wheelhouse with a frontal shield and an upper landing hatch reclining in a non-combat situation. Driver's observation device - a quick-change mirror glass block "triplex" 36 mm thick was located in the windshield (initially and on the sides of the cabin) behind a narrow slot covered by an armored shutter. In the bottom, six to ten millimeters thick, there was an emergency hatch.
The new tower, 375 mm high, designed by Yu. P. Yudovich, had a cone-shaped octahedral shape. It was welded from flat armor plates 25 millimeters thick, located at large angles of inclination, which significantly increased its durability during shelling. The thickness of the front zygomatic armor plates and the weapon mask subsequently reached 35 millimeters. The roof had a large commander's hatch with a round lid. In the lateral sides of the tower to the right and left of the shooter, narrow slots were made, equipped with two viewing devices of the "triplex" type. The tower was shifted to the port side.
On the second prototype T-60 (060), instead of the DShK, they installed a 20-mm ShVAK-tank cannon with a barrel length of 82.4 caliber, created on the basis of the wing and turret versions of the ShVAK-20 air cannon. The refinement of the gun, including the results of front-line use, continued in parallel with the development of its production. Therefore, it was officially accepted into service only on December 1, and on January 1, 1942, it received the designation TNSh-1 (tank Nudelman - Shpitalny) or TNSh-20, as it was later called.
For ease of guidance, the gun was placed in the turret with a significant offset from its axis to the right, which made it necessary to introduce corrections to the readings of the TMPP-1 telescopic sight. The tabular range of a direct shot reached 2500 meters, the aiming range was 7000, the rate of fire was up to 750 rds / min, the mass of a second salvo with armor-piercing shells was 1.208 kilograms. The gun had a belt feed with a capacity of 754 rounds (13 boxes). The ammunition set included fragmentation-tracer and fragmentation-incendiary rounds and armor-piercing incendiary rounds with a tungsten carbide core and a high initial velocity Vo \u003d 815 m / s, which made it possible to effectively hit light and medium armored targets, as well as machine gun points, anti-tank guns and the manpower of the enemy. Subsequently, the introduction of a sub-caliber armor-piercing incendiary projectile increased the armor penetration to 35 millimeters. As a result, the T-60 could fight at small distances with the German medium tanks Pz.III and Pz.IV of the early versions when firing at the side, and at distances up to 1000 meters - with armored personnel carriers and light self-propelled guns.
To the left of the cannon, a DT machine gun with an ammunition load of 1008 rounds (16 disks, later 15) was located in one coaxial installation.
Manufacturing enterprises
On September 15, 1941, the Moscow plant number 37 produced the first serial T-60, but due to the evacuation that followed soon, production was stopped already on October 26. In total, 245 T-60 tanks were made in Moscow. Instead of the initially supposed Tashkent, the enterprise was sent to Sverdlovsk, where a new tank plant number 37 was soon put into operation. Assembled there from December 15, 1941, mainly from parts brought from Moscow, the first two dozen T-30 and T-60 passed on January 1, 1942 along the Sverdlovsk streets. All in all, until September 1942, 1144 T-60s were built in the Urals, after which plant No. 37 was redesigned to manufacture components and assemblies for the T-34, as well as ammunition.
The workshops of the Kolomna machine-building plant named after Kuibyshev were involved in the production of armored hulls of the T-60 tank. In October 1941, some of them, including those that produced T-60 tank hulls for plant number 37, were evacuated to Kirov, to the site of the local machine-building plant NKPS named after May 1. A new plant number 38 was created here, and in January 1942 the first T-60s left its gates. In February, the 38th began their planned production, while simultaneously supplying the rest of the enterprises with cast track tracks, which were previously made only by STZ. During the first quarter, 241 vehicles were manufactured, and by June - another 535 units.
T-30 
T-40 
T-70
Was involved in the production of T-60 and plant number 264 (Krasnoarmeisky shipyard in the city of Sarepta near Stalingrad, previously producing river armored boats). He received the technical documentation for the tank in a timely manner, but later he drove the car on his own, without resorting to the help of the head enterprise, but without trying to modernize it. On September 16, 1941, the workers of the evacuated KhTZ, familiar with tank building, joined the factory team, who, back in Kharkov, began to master the production of the T-60. They arrived at the 264th with a ready-made stock of tools, patterns, dies and tank blanks, so the first armored hull was welded by September 29. The transmission and chassis units were to be supplied by STZ (plant # 76). Loaded with the production of T-34 and diesel engines V-2, moreover, which turned out to be their only manufacturer at the end of 1941, the Stalingrad enterprise and plant No. 264, which supplied it with armored hulls and welded towers for "thirty-fours", could not give the same amount to the light T-60 attention. Nevertheless, the first 52 vehicles were assembled in December. In total, 830 T-60s were produced here by June 1942. A significant part of them took part in the Battle of Stalingrad, especially in its initial phase.
The main and largest plant for the production of T-60 was GAZ, where on October 16, 1941, N.A. Astrov arrived for permanent work with a small group of Moscow colleagues to provide design support for production. Soon he was appointed deputy chief designer of the tank building enterprise, and at the beginning of 1942 he received the Stalin Prize for the creation of the T-40 and T-60.
In a short time, GAZ completed the manufacture of non-standard technological equipment and, on October 26, began the mass production of T-60 tanks. Armored hulls for them in increasing quantities began to be supplied by the Vyksa plant of crushing and grinding equipment (DRO) No. 177, later - by the Murom steam locomotive repair plant named after V.I. Dzerzhinsky № 176 with its powerful boiler production, technologically similar to the tank corps, and, finally, the oldest armored plant № 178 in the city of Kulebaki. Then they were joined by a part of the Podolsk plant No. 180 evacuated to Saratov on the territory of the local steam locomotive repair plant. Yet armored hulls were chronically lacking, which hindered the expansion of the mass production of the T-60. Therefore, soon their welding was additionally organized at GAZ. In September, only three T-60 tanks were manufactured in Gorky. But already in October - 215, in November - 471. Until the end of 1941, 1323 vehicles were produced here.
In 1942, despite the creation and adoption of a more efficient light tank T-70, the parallel production of the T-60 remained at GAZ until April (in total for 1942 - 1639 vehicles), at the Sverdlovsk plant number 37 - until August , at the plant number 38 - until July. In 1942, 4164 tanks were made at all factories. The last 55 cars were handed over at the beginning of 1943 (through February). In total, 5839 T-60s were produced since 1941, the army received 5796 vehicles.
Baptism of fire
The first mass use of the T-60 refers to the Battle of Moscow. They were present in almost all tank brigades and individual tank battalions defending the capital. On November 7, 1941, 48 T-60s from the 33rd Tank Brigade took part in the parade on Red Square. These were tanks of Moscow production, the Gorky T-60s first entered the battle near Moscow only on December 13.
T-60s began to arrive at the Leningrad Front in the spring of 1942, when 60 vehicles with crews were allocated to form the 61st Tank Brigade. The story of their delivery to the besieged city is interesting. They decided to transport the tanks on barges with coal. It was pretty good in terms of disguise. The barges were transporting fuel to Leningrad, became familiar to the enemy and not every time they were actively hunted. In addition, coal as ballast provided river vessels with the necessary stability.
They loaded combat vehicles from the pier above the Volkhov hydroelectric power station. Log decks were laid on coal, tanks were placed on them, and barges were pushed off the coast. Enemy aviation did not manage to detect the movement of our military unit.
The baptism of fire of the 61st tank brigade fell on January 12, 1943 - the first day of the operation to break the blockade of Leningrad. Moreover, the brigade, like the 86th and 118th tank battalions, also armed with light tanks, operated in the first echelon of the 67th Army and crossed the Neva across the ice. Units equipped with medium and heavy tanks entered the battle only on the second day of the offensive, after a bridgehead two or three kilometers deep was captured, and the sappers strengthened the ice.
The T-60s also fought on the Southern Front, especially actively in the spring of 1942 in the Crimea, participated in the Kharkov operation and in the defense of Stalingrad. T-60s made up a significant part of the combat vehicles of the 1st Tank Corps (commanded by Major General M.E. Katukov), together with other formations of the Bryansk Front, which repulsed the German offensive in the Voronezh direction in the summer of 1942.
By the beginning of the counteroffensive of the Stalingrad, Don and Southwestern Fronts on November 19, 1942, quite a few combat vehicles of this type remained in the tank brigades. The insufficiently armored and weakly armed T-60 had very low stability on the battlefield, becoming an easy prey for medium and heavy enemy tanks. In fairness, it must be admitted that the tankers did not particularly like these lightly armored and weakly armed vehicles with fire-hazardous gasoline engines, calling them BM-2 - a mass grave for two.
The last major operation in which the T-60 was used was the lifting of the blockade of Leningrad in January 1944. So, among the 88 vehicles of the 1st Tank Brigade of the Leningrad Front there were 21 T-60s, in the 220th Tank Brigade there were 18 of them, and in the 124th Tank Regiment of the Volkhov Front, by the beginning of the operation on January 16, 1944, only 10 were available. combat vehicles: two T-34, two T-70, five T-60 and even one T-40.
On the basis of the T-60, the BM-8-24 rocket launcher (1941) was produced, and prototypes of a tank with a 37-mm ZIS-19 cannon, a 37-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (1942), 76.2 mm a self-propelled artillery mount, an anti-aircraft tank T-60-3 with two twin 12.7 mm DShK machine guns (1942) and an OSU-76 self-propelled artillery mount (1944). All these vehicles were not very successful, since the T-60 tank was clearly not suitable for use as a base for an ACS.
Why did they produce these cars?
Usually, the T-60 is compared with its "colleague" in armament - the German Pz.II light tank. This is all the more interesting because these vehicles met in real combat. Analyzing the data of these tanks, we can say that the Soviet tank builders managed to achieve almost the same level of protection as the German vehicle, which, with a smaller mass and dimensions, significantly increased the invulnerability of the T-60. The dynamic characteristics of both machines are almost the same. Despite its high power density, the Pz.II was not faster than the "sixty". The armament parameters were also formally the same: both tanks were equipped with 20 mm cannons with similar ballistic characteristics. The muzzle velocity of the Pz.II cannon's armor-piercing projectile was 780 m / s, the T-60 - 815 m / s, which theoretically allowed them to hit the same targets.
In fact, everything was not so simple: the Soviet TNSh-20 cannon could not fire with single shots, and the German KwK 30, as well as the KwK 38, could, which significantly increased the firing accuracy. Even when firing in short bursts, the T-60 cannon was recoiled to the side, which made it impossible to effectively fire at the infantry or group targets (for example, a cluster of vehicles). The "two" proved to be more effective on the battlefield also due to the size of the crew, which consisted of three people and, moreover, had a much better view from the tank than the crew of the T-60. An important advantage was the presence of a radio station. As a result, the Pz.II significantly surpassed the "sixty" as a leading edge vehicle. This advantage was felt even more when using tanks for reconnaissance, where the inconspicuous, but "blind" and "dumb" T-60 was practically useless. The situation was no better when the T-60 was used as an infantry escort tank: the too weak armor of the "sixty" was easily hit by almost all anti-tank weapons and heavy weapons of the Wehrmacht infantry.
As a result, we can conclude that the T-60 tank was completely unnecessary for the Red Army, since it did not correspond to any TTT (if they were developed for it at all). These vehicles, rarely surviving one attack, are often called suicide tanks. Almost six thousand T-60s literally burned down in the crucible of war. Moreover, they burned down almost without a trace: relatively few front-line photographs of these vehicles remained, little is stored in the archives and documents on their combat use. Just a few tanks of this type have survived to this day.
The question naturally arises: why were they released at all? The motivation of Plant No. 37 is clear, but why did the Supreme Command Headquarters agree with this motivation? The latter circumstance can be explained by the desire to make up for the huge losses in tanks - on the one hand, and a greatly overestimated estimate of the number of the German tank fleet - on the other. Imagine that the Germans, having five times fewer tanks than the Red Army, achieve success thanks to a well-thought-out organizational structure of tank formations, excellent interaction with other branches of the armed forces, good controllability and advanced tactical methods of using them, at the Headquarters, apparently, simply does not could. Alas, at that moment we could not oppose anything but a quantitative advantage.
Well, if not the T-60, then what? Yes, what the Red Army sorely lacked throughout the war - armored personnel carriers! Imagine something resembling a T-60 chassis, but without a turret, and, say, with a pivot or turret (which is better) installation of a DT or DShK machine gun and an anti-tank gun in addition, capable of transporting at least four to five infantrymen. This is how the Lend-Lease tracked armored personnel carriers "Universal" were equipped, which were valued by fighters for their weight in gold. And we received only two thousand of them. If instead of the T-60, as, indeed, the T-70 that followed them, the troops received 14 thousand tracked armored personnel carriers, then the truth is, they would be much more useless.
But history has no subjunctive mood. What was, what was, and nothing can be fixed. And not to resurrect the crews of mass graves for two. Eternal memory to them, eternal glory to them!
PJSC "Plant of Corps" manufactures armored hulls and turrets for armored personnel carriers BTR-80, BTR-80A, BTR-80K, BTR-90 and their modifications by the order of the Ministry of Defense.
Armored personnel carrier BTR-80is a combat wheeled amphibious vehicle with weapons, armor protection and high mobility. It is intended for use in motorized rifle units of the ground forces. The turret of the armored personnel carrier houses a machine-gun mount, consisting of 14.5-mm and 7.62-mm machine guns. An armored personnel carrier is a four-axle, eight-wheeled vehicle with all driving wheels, capable of moving behind tanks, overcoming trenches, trenches and water obstacles on the move. The BTR-80 is equipped with a smoke grenade launch system for setting smoke screens for camouflage purposes.
Armored personnel carrier BTR-80A: One of the modifications of the BTR-80, the standard armament of the BTR-80 was replaced with a 30-mm 2A72 automatic cannon and a 7.62-mm PKT machine gun paired with it.
Armored personnel carrier BTR-90 continued the family of eight-wheeled Soviet armored personnel carriers (BTR-60, BTR-70, BTR-80). The changes concerned primarily weapons and increased armor protection. The KPVT heavy machine gun and its turret were replaced by the fighting compartment, which houses four types of weapons at once: a 30-mm 2A4A automatic cannon, a 7.62-mm PKT machine gun, an AG-17 grenade launcher and an anti-tank missile system (ATGM). The armament complex allows the BTR-90 to fight against tanks at ranges over 4 kilometers, to destroy armored vehicles, helicopters and light engineering structures at ranges up to 2500 meters, and manpower at ranges up to 4000 meters. The carrying capacity of the BTR-90 and the internal volume allow it to be used as a chassis for a 120-mm anti-tank gun, mortars, anti-aircraft missile and anti-tank systems.
Armored personnel carrier BTR-82 (BTR-82A)This vehicle was created by the designers and labor collectives of the enterprises of the Military Industrial Company in close cooperation with the specialists of the Russian Ministry of Defense during the implementation of the program of deep modernization of the armored personnel carriers BTR-80 and BTR-80A.
When developing this machine, the designers took into account all the proposals and requirements of the customer, obtained in the course of a thorough study of the operating experience and combat use of armored personnel carriers. Despite the outwardly similarity of the new armored personnel carrier with its predecessors, the BTR-80A, the modernized vehicles are qualitatively different from them. The main goals of the modernization program were: a comprehensive increase in tactical, technical and operational characteristics, firepower, mobility, security and command control; increase in reliability, production, operational and repair manufacturability.
Thanks to the measures taken, the combat effectiveness coefficient of the BTR-82A has doubled compared to the BTR-80A. By all indicators of combat effectiveness, the wheeled BTR-82A is capable of solving tasks on the battlefield that were previously solved by tracked BMP-1 and BMP-2
Armored personnel carrier BTR-70M. The vehicle is a modernized armored personnel carrier of the BTR-70 type, which, in the process of modernization, is replaced by the engine compartment, weapons and most of the other components and assemblies. In terms of its characteristics, it is close to the BTR-80.
BRDM-2M (Armored reconnaissance and patrol vehicle-2) - is a further development of the BRDM. BRDM-2M has a very high maneuverability. Currently, to one degree or another, it is used in intelligence units of more than 50 countries.
Special police car (SPM-1 and SPM-2) "Tiger" is intended for use as a vehicle and operational-service vehicle of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia during counter-terrorist operations, performing territorial defense tasks, providing assistance to the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia, including transporting personnel during a march, protecting the crew from firearms and the damaging factors of explosive devices. SPM-2 "Tiger" is an armored vehicle with 5th protection class. There are two hatches in the roof of the car, in the cabin, in addition to accommodating the crew, there are places for installing a radio station and a blocker for radio-controlled explosive devices.
SPM-1 is equipped with additional options such as an air conditioning system, a bracket for installing weapons, etc.
K1SH1 - with and without armored hood. Unified chassis. It is produced on the basis of the BTR-80 with an increased body volume for the installation of communication equipment, reconnaissance equipment, medical equipment, etc.
PJSC "Plant of Korpus" manufactures products from sheet armor steel.
